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 1.  Introduction 
 
Rural reforms in China started two decades ago replaced the former collectives with the 
household responsibility system (HRS). Under the HRS, land is tenured equally by certain 
demographic criteria to the member households and subject to periodical administrative 
reallocations by the former collective with respect to demographic and land usage 
changes. In the meantime, land market has gradually developed in a way of a rental 
market. In the market, land is still collective or state owned and sales of land are legally 
prohibited, rental activities between farm households may or may not involving rent.  
 
The egalitarian principle has been applied in both the initial land tenure and later 
reallocations by the former collectives, though the process may slightly differ from case to 
case. As a means of redistribution, the primary function of the land tenure is to ensure the 
equity of land endowment among the households, and land tenured is also used as a last 
resort of household insurance for living.  
 
Land rental activities appeared as early as land tenure started. Most of previous studies in 
this area tend to focus on reasons for the land market development (e.g. Yao, 2000; Kung, 
2002; Kroskopf, 2002). Efficiency and equity effects of this new development, however, 
were largely ignored, except in a few studies (Zhang and Somwaru, 2001; Deininger and 
Jin; 2002).  
 
Development of land market in China is closely dependent on the off-farm opportunities 
resulted from expansion of urban sectors and rural non-farming activities and in return the 
market ensures a development process in which more labour resources is transferred to 
non-farming sectors (Yao, 2000; Zhao, 2002). Without a coherent development of both   2
markets, great quantity of land may be abandoned or provision of labour resources to non-
farming sector is limited. In this regard, the rental market has reduced the marginal land 
and labour resources and improved productive efficiency.  
 
The question arises whether the rental market transfers land from less productive farms to 
more productive ones in a dynamic economic development process. It appears to be the 
case if farming is the only choice of the farm households, since resource reallocations in a 
perfect market suffice a Pareto improvement or efficiency improvement. However, as land 
rental market and associated factor markets such as labour and credit markets in China are 
imperfect and there exist off-farm employment opportunities, it is possible that households 
rent out land are also ones with higher agricultural productivity. In other words, whether 
the rental market improves efficiency of households involved is an empirical issue. In 
addition, as the equity of land distribution is a fundamental objective of the land tenure 
system, we are interested in land distributional effect of the rental market. If the rental 
market can improve equity of land distribution as some studies suggested (e.g. Deininger 
and Jin, 2002), it may partly replace the main function of the administrative reallocation. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Development of the land rental market 
in China and possible impacts of this development are reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, 
we used panel data of 450 households in seven years (1995-2001) of Zhejiang province, 
China to examine the land distributional and crop income effects of the rental market. The 
paper concludes with discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Land rental market and its effects 
There is no official figure for the magnitude of land rental market in China. Figures used 
in various studies differ as most of studies only cover part of China and in different years.   3
A national survey of over 20, 000 farm households organised by the Research Centre of 
Rural Economy of the Ministry of Agriculture over the period starting from 1986 suggests 
that the proportion of land rent-in and rent-out in total operational land area increased 
from 3.4% in 1986 to 8.7% in 2003 (RCRE, various years). The rental incidents also differ 
from region to region. In 2003, these figures for the East, Central and Western China are 
7.1%, 11.4% and 4.2%, respectively. 
 
These figures appear to be smaller than many other studies in this area. In a study based on 
surveys in six provinces in China in 1998, Lohmar, Zhang and Somwaru (2001) indicate 
that on average of 825 households surveyed, 24% of households had land rent-in and 5% 
of households had land rent-out. Measured in total operational land area, rent-in land 
accounts for 13% and rent-out land only accounts for 2% of the land. 
 
Another survey conducted in three Western and central Chinese provinces Hunan, 
Guizhou and Yunnan based on samples of rural household surveys of National Statistical 
Bureau (NSB) by Deininger and Jin (2002) suggests that land rental markets have 
emerged rapidly over the period of 1995-2001, from virtually non-existent in 1995 to be 
utilized by 9.4% of households in 2001, ranged from 6.1% in Guizhou, 13.2% in Yunnan 
and 14.3% in Hunan, and with an additional 3% of households receiving land for free.  
 
There were also reports of low incidents of land rental market. Turner et al (2001) reported 
that rented land only accounted for 3-4% of total arable land in their samples. The land 
market development has been largely affected by the household heterogeneity and driven 
by the off-farm opportunities (Yao, 2000; Zhao, 2002). Other factors such as ambiguity of 
the land ownership, tax or tax in kind, administrative intervention and frequent   4
administrative land reallocations to certain extent restricted development of the land rental 
market (Turner et al. 2001, Lohmar et al 2001; Kung, 2002).  
 
Equity and efficiency effects of the land market development are the main concerns of 
economists and policy makers. Equity effect can be measured as changes in distribution of 
income, consumption or access to production means among the households. Efficiency 
effect can also be measured in terms of changes in income and production.  
 
Effects of land rental market on production efficiency improvement are likely to be from 
following sources. First, a land rental market may make part of land abandoned due to 
various reasons to be used by other farmers. Land abandonment can be caused by farmers 
and their families leaving farm for non-farming sectors or for other reasons
1. In an 
economic development process, when rural labour moving from farming to non-farming 
sectors, without a rental market, farm households may choose land abandonment. This has 
been case in many developed countries such as Japan and Korea in their dynamic 
economic development stage. Land rent market to certain extent may reduce land 
abandonment. Therefore, land rental can be regarded as a save from the abandonment. 
 
Second, the rental market may facilitate an efficient allocation of land as more efficient 
households gain land from less efficient ones. More efficient households tend to have 
higher marginal product of land in the production and are able to attract more land at a 
higher rent threshold.  
 
                                                 
1 No studies in this area are available in Chinese case. A study of Grinfeld et al (2004) suggests that four 
exogenous factors: personal, physical, property and historical may have caused land abandonment. There is 
no official figure of land abandonment available and it may also differ from region to region. According to 
my own discussion with local officials in Zhejiang in 2004, land abandoned accounted for approximately 5% 
of total land.    5
Third, there is possibility that the land rental may reduce land fragmentation and exploit 
economy of scale. As the land concentration may facilitate agricultural mechanisation and 
uses of new agricultural technology, a rent market may boost total production and reduce 
the production costs. 
 
In the literature, two different approaches, namely a direct and an indirect one, have been 
used to capture effects of rental markets. In a study of Nicaraguan land market, Deininger, 
Zegarra and Lavadenz (2003) used an indirect approach. They have concluded their study 
based on two arguments. First, they proved that land market increased equity of operative 
land allocation among households. Second, by using a production (profit) function 
approach, they found that there existed an inverse relationship between profit and 
operational size in the households. Land market in this case brings land from large to 
small producers and this increases overall efficiency as well as equality. 
 
Two existing studies in Chinese cases used a direct approach. Deininger and Jin (2002) 
developed a framework with off-farm employment opportunities, transaction costs and an 
unobserved household’s level of agricultural ability to study Chinese land rental market. 
They found that both administrative reallocation and market based rental activities 
increase the amount of land available to the land poor but more efficient farmers. In 
another study based on surveys in six provinces in China in 1998, Lohmar, Zhang and 
Somwaru (2001) used data of 1422 grain plots reported in the survey and a production 
function approach to examine the rental market effect. A dummy variable for rent-in 
households was used to prove that rent-in households are more efficient.  
 
In this study, Gini coefficients of land distribution before and after land rentals are used to 
measure the equity effect of the land rental market while a calculation of improved   6
production efficiency based on a production function approach is used to measure the 
efficiency improvement.  
 
3. Data and Analysis 
 
Data used in this study are the survey data for the same 450 households in nine villages of 
Zhejiang province in China during the period of 1995-2001. The surveys were part of 
national surveys organized annually by the Ministry of Agriculture. It covers the areas of 
household resource endowment, production, consumption, and incomes. Zhejiang 
province is one of the richest coastal provinces in China with very small average farm size 
and dominating private non-farming sectors. By using the same households we intend to 
reduce bias caused by individual household characteristics and take its econometric 
advantages. 
 
3.1 Land Distributional Effect 
 
As the administrative allocation will also change the land distribution among households, 
we calculated the Gini coefficients for both tenured land and operative land. Changes in 
land area and land rental in the sampled households of Zhejiang province during the 
period of 1996-2001 are reported in the Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Farm size measured in both tenured land or operational land is very small by any 
standards. Even such a small size is further declined in the period. As expected, total land 
tenured and operated by the households in the period has fallen considerably. Measured in   7
per household and per capita basis, in the six year period between 1996 and 2001, the 
tenured size in the sample households for both measurements fell by 23% and 22%, while 
the operational land size which includes the rent-in and excludes the rent-out fell by 21% 
and 19%, respectively.  
 
The relatively higher levels of the operational size against the tenured size in all three 
categories for all years suggest that the sample households may have rented in land from 
households in the outside of samples. Land market appears to have changed land 
distribution among households. Although the percentage of households involved in land 
rental market fluctuated, land rental as a percentage of total land area increased steadily in 
the period.  
 
The average of farm size however does not indicate anything in land distribution. The land 
distribution is measured by the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is often calculated 
with the more practical Brown Formula shown below: 
 
1
11 0 1( ) ( )
kn
kk k k k GX X Y Y
=−
++ = =− − + ∑        [ 1 ]  
 
Where G is Gini coefficient, X is the cumulated proportion of the population variable and 
Y is the cumulated proportion of the land variable (i.e. land per capita or per labour).   In 
the calculation, data are first sorted by land variable in ascending order and each 
household is assumed to one group, therefore k here is the total number of households. 
Gini coefficients calculated by operational land size and by tenured land size are reported 
in Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 here   8
 
It is clear that:   
1.  The Gini coefficients measured by tenured land size are small, indicating that 
initial differences among households by the administrative way in both per capita 
and per labour bases are small.  
2.  Gini coefficients measuring land distribution of the tenured land by two categories 
(by population per capital and by labour per capita) are slightly lower than those by 
operative land size which includes land rental, indicating that land is more 
concentrated with the rental market. This result is different from observations from 
many other countries in which land reform program was not carried out (Deininger 
et al 2003). In those countries, rental market led to reduction of Gini coefficients. It 
is also different from findings of Deininger and Jin in their Chinese study (2002) 
which claims that land market enhanced equal land distribution in China
2.  
3.  The coefficients of tenured land fell considerably in 1998 and 1999, which are 
consistent with the uses of administrative land reallocation in these two yeas in the 
sampled sites after the announcement of Land Contract Law, confirming that the 
administrative land reallocation mainly serves an equity role.  
 
3.2 Production Efficiency Effect 
 
As discussed earlier, production efficiency improvement can be from a reduction of land 
abandonment and improved production efficiency. In this study, a production function 
approach is used to examine improved production efficiency. The specification of the 
                                                 
2 It would be difficult to give a clear diagnosis for the problems in Deininger and Jin (2002), as no detailed 
description on the calculation of Gini coefficients is available. However, it is possible that household 
heterogeneity may have attributed to the problem as their samples covers more different regions and their 
calculated Gini coefficients are much larger than that in this study.   9
production function used in this study is slightly different from Lohmar et al (2001). A 
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Where Yjt is the crop output of the jth farm household at year t; T is time trend to capture 
technical progress over the period; Xijt, is a vector of input quantities used by the 
household which include material input costs (including seeds, fertiliser, pesticides, 
machinery costs, etc.), labour inputs (working days) and sown area; G is the proportion of 
grain sown area in total sown area to capture differences in crop structure; D is the dummy 
variable used to distinguish the rental behaviour of the households. All households are 
divided into three categories: rent-in, autarky and rent-out households. In order to examine 
if the rent behaviour have a neutral or input embedded effect for the production, both 
single dummy variable and the products of rent-in dummy and three basic inputs (labour, 
sown area and material costs) are included in the estimation. V is village dummies to 
capture village differences. H is the dummy variable for households. Apart from 
individual household effect, four household level characteristics (head education, head 
age, head social status and party membership) are also included in estimation. Results of 
various estimations are reported in Table 3 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Models have relatively good fit for the data. Its adjusted R squares are 0.87 for all four 
models, indicating that variables included can explain 87% of crop output variation. 
Coefficients for all basic input variables and time trend are positive and significant at the 
99% significant level; proportion of grain sown area is also positive but only significant at   10
95% significant level. Coefficients for all household level characteristics are not 
significant at the 95% level but all village dummies are significant at 99% level, 
suggesting strong village differences. 
 
Household is operating under the diminishing return to the scale. F tests for the sum of 
elsaticities for basic inputs (capital, labor and land) indicate that in all four models the 
hypothesis of the sum equal to unity is rejected
3.   
 
The coefficients for rental dummies and dummy product terms are our main interests. 
Without product terms (Model 4), rent-in dummy is positive and significant at 99% level 
but rent-out dummy is positive but insignificant, indicating that with the same levels of 
inputs crop output in the land rent-in households appear to be higher.  
 
When the product terms are introduced (Models 1 and 2), however, the coefficient for 
rent-in dummy term becomes significant but negative. Product term of rent-in dummy and 
labor is positive and that of dummy and sown area is negative and both are significant at 
the 95% level. While the coefficients of product terms become insignificant when both 
rent-in and rent-out dummies are removed.  
 
By further looking at input structure of the three types of farm households, we found that 
household’s tenured land size for rent-in households is slightly lower but its operational 
size is significantly larger than other two groups (Table 4). It is the same if we calculated 
in land per capital basis. On average, rent-out households tend to have higher inputs (land, 
labor, material inputs) per mu land and higher crop output than autarky households and 
rent-in ones.  Its grain sown area proportion however is lower than other two. Compared 
                                                 
3 F tests for the unity restriction for four models are 35.0, 34.7, 37.1 and 32.5, respectively.    11
to autarky households, rent-in households have lower land multi-cropping rate, similar 
labor input level but higher material input and output levels. Their grain share levels are 
quite similar. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Without a land rental market, land rented out by farm households may be partly or totally 
abandoned. In this study, as the likelihood of land abandonment without the land rental 
market is not clear, we consider its productive effects in the two extreme scenarios: (1) all 
land rent-in are abandoned and (2) all rent-in land will be maintained for production by 
rentees. By using Model 4 in the Table 3, we find that under the first scenario, the crop 
production with the rental market is 15% higher than without the market in the sample 
households and under the second scenario the difference made by the rental activities 
alone contributed 0.22% of total crop output
4. 
 
4. Discussions and Conclusion 
 
By using household survey data in Zhejiang, China, we analyse land distributional effect 
and income effect of land rental market. By comparing land distribution with and without 
the land rental market, we found that the rental market has contributed to less equal 
distribution of land resources among farm households while the administrative 
reallocations served an equalitarian role. Therefore the land rental market may not be able 
to replace the function of administrative reallocation. 
                                                 
4 By the first scenario, rent-in land accounts for 43% of total operational land and it contributes 35% of total 
production in the households. With the second scenario, the difference between with and without the rental 
market has mainly to do with the total land rented in the rent-in households. According to a decomposition 
of the Model 4, the total extra contribution made by the rent-in dummy accounted for only 0.64% of total 
crop output in rent-in households. As rent-in households accounted for 35% of total production, we arrive a   12
 
Land distributional effect of the rental market is associated with the fact that land 
resources in China after later 1980s is very much equally tenured and it is also subject to 
constant administrative reallocations with respect to demographic changes and non-
agricultural land uses. There is no sign of easing this type of land reallocation even after 
government encouragement for longer and more secured tenures. 
 
In a dynamic economic development process as in Zhejiang, efficiency improvement 
appears mainly from saves from land abandonment as without a land rental market part or 
total of land rented may be abandoned. In our case, if all rent-in land is to be abandoned, 
total production will be 15% lower while compared to a case that all land is maintained in 
production by rent-out households, production gain with a rental market is only 0.22% 
higher.  
 
Efficiency improvement in the rent-in households may have mainly to do with 
reorganising its input structure. As we can see from Table 4, land has moved from high 
inputs / high output households to low inputs / low output households. Although land per 
capita in rent-in households is initially slightly lower by tenured land, its land is used less 
intensively in terms of multi-cropping rate and its land productivity is actually slightly 
lower than rent-out households. This also suggests that land rental market driven by a 
development process may be quite different from that caused by the inequality of land 
distribution. 
 
The moderate efficiency improvement in the rent-in households may be related to two 
factors. First, land rentals in this study occur in a dynamic economic development process 
                                                                                                                                                   
0.22% contribution.    13
in which the main reason of the land rental is to facilitating labour transferring from 
agriculture to non-agricultural sectors. In this case, there is possibility that more 
productive farmers, usually with better education and skills, will be among those leaving 
farming. This may partly offset gains from the rental market
5. Second, under the current 
technology level and farm size, efficiency improvement from reducing land fragmentation 
and economic scale will be very limited (Wu, et al., 2005).  
 
To conclude, both ways of land reallocation serves different roles in Chinese agriculture. 
Even without land market Chinese land distribution will become more unequal due to 
demographic and land use changes, development of land market will accelerate the 
concentration of land. Empirical examination suggests that with land market land is 
moving to households with higher efficiency in which less intensive uses of resources and 
different production structure is observed, however, in a economic development process 
the main efficiency contribution of the rental market comes from saves for land 
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Table 1 Changes in land area and land rental in Zhejiang province  















1996 2.17  0.57  2.06  0.54  34.5  19.4 
1997 2.11  0.59  1.99  0.56  30.9  17.8 
1998 2.10  0.66  1.94  0.61  35.5  26.1 
1999 2.10  0.53  1.85  0.47  37.9  25.6 
2000 1.94  0.59  1.91  0.58  41.0  38.6 
2001 1.71  0.46  1.58  0.42  29.3  31.7 
2001 as % 
of 1996  79  81  77  78  85  163 
Source: own calculation 
Note:   (1) As one village in the survey is a sea fishery village without any farmland, only data of 450 
households in other nine villages is used in the calculation;  
(2) As 1995 data includes many missing data, it is excluded from the calculation and later 
modelling work;  (3) A mu is one fifteenth hectare.  
 
Table 2 the Calculated Gini coefficients for land distribution 
  Operational land  Tenured land 
  By population  By labour  By population  By labour 
1996 0.243  0.190  0.193  0.197 
1997 0.265  0.227  0.197  0.230 
1998 0.214  0.226  0.207  0.238 
1999 0.207  0.190  0.169  0.240 
2000 0.189  0.150  0.174  0.164 
2001 0.154  0.195  0.150  0.179 
Note:   (1) Both land area per capital and per labour are used in the calculation; 
(2) Operational land includes both rent-in and rent-out.   16
Table 3 Fixed Effect Models of Household Income under Land Rental Market 
  Model 1  Model2  Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff  T  test  Coeff  T  Test  Coeff  T  Test  Coeff  T  Test 
Material input 
0.368 21.4  0.370 21.5  0.383 22.6  0.388 24.3 
Labor Input 
0.161 13.7  0.161 13.8  0.175 15.6  0.174 16.1 
Sown area 
0.398 18.8  0.397 18.8  0.371 18.6  0.374 19.8 
Grain share 
0.059 2.3  0.061 2.3  0.058 2.2  0.060 2.3 
rent-in dummy 
-0.544  -3.8  -0.548  -3.8    0.050  2.8 
rent-out dummy 
0.014  0.6  0.013  0.6    0.018  0.7 
time trend 
0.015 3.3  0.015 3.5  0.016 3.6  0.016 3.7 
dummy *capital 
0.037 1.4  0.037 1.4  0.019 0.7     
Dummy*labor 
0.086 2.8  0.087 2.9  -0.006  -0.3     
Dummy*sown 
-0.074 -2.0  -0.074 -2.0  0.009  0.3     
Village  dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
EDU1 
-0.032  -0.9        
EDU2 
-0.045  -1.5        
EDU3 
-0.026  -0.8        
STATE 
-0.078  -1.6        
LOCAL 
0.046  1.4        
PARTY 
-0.004  -0.2        
AGE1 
0.007  0.2        
AGE5 
-0.007  -0.3        
Constant 
4.152 50.1  4.107 53.8  4.004 56.5  3.983 56.8 
No of Observation  1988    1988    1988    1988   
Adjusted R
2  0.87   0.87   0.87   0.87  
Note:    (1) Households without involved in farming activities will need to be excluded from the 
sample of estimation. 
(2) Crop output and material input costs were respectively deflated by price index of crop 
output and input price index in Zhejiang province. 
(3) Except those specified, dummy here refers to rent-in dummy. 
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Table 4 Land, Crop Output and Input Structure in Three Types of Households  
   Rent-Out  Autarky  Rent-in 
Tenured land (mu/h)  2.55  2.50  2.15  Land 
Operational Land (mu/h)  1.56  2.50  3.77 
Output  Output (yuan/ mu)  1156.32  895.46  959.67 
MCI (%)  196.98  172.93  167.46 
Labor (days/mu)  37.54  30.29  31.03 
Material costs (yuan/mu)  286.65  211.63  274.23 
Input 
Intensity 
Grain share (%)  63  73  74 
Land (by sown area)  587  518  573 
Labor 30.80  29.56  30.93 
Partial 
productivity 
for  Working capital  4.03  4.23  3.50 
Note:   (1) The same data for the model is used in calculation; (2) Output and inputs are calculated in 
operational land basis and land productivity is calculated in sown area basis. 